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Abstract 
Research into legal education suggests that many students enter law school with ideals about using the 
law to achieve social change, but graduate with some cynicism regarding these ideals. It is often argued that law 
schools provide a negative, competitive, and conservative environment for students, pushing many away from 
social justice ideals towards more self-interested, vocational concerns. 
This article uses Michel Foucault’s work on the government of the self to suggest another way of 
understanding this process. It examines a range of prescriptive texts that provide students with advice about how 
to study law and ‘survive’ law school. In doing so, it posits that this apparent loss of social ideals does not 
necessarily always signify that the student has become politically conservative or has had a negative educational 
experience. While these legal personae may appear outwardly conservative, and indeed still reflect particular 
gendered or raced perspectives, by examining the messages that these texts offer students, this article suggests 
that an apparent loss of social ideals can be the result of a productive shaping of the self. The legal persona they 
fashion can incorporate social justice ideals and necessitate specific ways of acting on those ideals. This analysis 
adds to the growing body of research that uses Foucault’s work to rethink common narratives of power and the 
shaping of the self in legal education, and provides legal educators new ways of reflecting on the effects of legal 
education. 
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Introduction1 
Schleef (2000, p. 157) describes the ‘Holy Grail’ of legal education researchers as the desire to 
understand why some law students, despite entering legal education with ‘altruistic aspirations geared toward 
public service’, take jobs in corporate practice upon graduation. Studies repeatedly suggest that this occurs to a 
sizeable portion of students, with many becoming alienated from their studies, losing any social justice 
orientation that they once possessed, or, in extreme cases, developing mental illnesses as a result of their degree 
(Allen and Baron 2004, p.286; Booth 2004, p. 281; Carroll and Brayfield 2007, p. 242; Colby et al. 2003; 
Economides 1997, p. 29; Kennedy in Schlag 1999, pp. 202-203; McGlade 2005, p. 16; Schleef 2000, p. 157; 
Sheldon and Krieger 2007, pp. 883-884 and 893-894; Stone 1997, p. 56; Thornton 1996, p. 77; Webb 1999, pp. 
285-286). 
While seeking to answer this ‘Holy Grail’, some researchers have argued that broader social forces 
(such as the higher education and professional markets), in conjunction with the institutional structure of law 
schools (understood as closely aligned to the legal profession, and consisting of competitive environments 
where the political conservatism of other students and staff dominates), push idealistic students away from 
broader ‘social justice’ messages and towards narrower professional interests. Some more critical scholars have 
even suggested that this loss of ideals occurs because students are either becoming self-interested and are trying 
to position themselves most favourably in the legal job market, or because they have simply given up on these 
social justice ideals because they are not fostered within the legal curriculum (for a range of sources exploring 
these debates, see Ward 2004, p. 145; Simpson and Charlesworth 1995, p. 106; Allen and Baron 2004, p. 288; 
Thornton 1996, pp. 77-78; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, pp. 540-544 and 555; Thornton 2004, pp. 486-487; Hunt 
1986, pp. 11-13; and Ball (forthcoming) for further critiques of these arguments). Simply put, this loss of ideals 
is either understood as the result of the student’s passivity to imposing and oppressive power relations, or as a 
result of their acquiescence to professional ideologies that are supposedly not ‘really’ in their interests. In 
neither case is it positioned as the result of an active work by the student on their own ethical and moral values, 
which may have productive outcomes (including, counter-intuitively, the pursuit of social justice-related goals). 
Taking its cue from Michel Foucault’s understandings of power and the formation of the self, this 
article positions the apparent loss of social ideals in students as part of the process of fashioning a legal persona 
through law school. While this process ultimately works in conjunction with other forms of power (including 
disciplinary and governmental forms) (see Thornton 1996; Ball (forthcoming)) and particular formulations of 
power and knowledge (see James 2006, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d), this relationship to the self will be the 
focus of this discussion. Using Foucault’s work on ethics and the formation of the self to examine a range of 
prescriptive texts offering advice about how students can successfully study law, it will outline the relation that 
these texts encourage students to establish with themselves throughout their legal education. These texts suggest 
that students ought to maintain a concern for civil liberties and achieving justice, but to do so in such a way that 
overt political activism is tempered, and that they understand their work as legal professionals as positioned 
outside of politics, even though it may still involve the pursuit of socially just ends. By analysing prescriptive 
texts in this manner, it becomes possible to understand the apparent loss of social ideals as a productive process 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Belinda Carpenter, Clare O’Farrell, Nick James, Reece Walters, and Christian Callisen for their comments 
and feedback on the various stages of this research, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. 
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that does not necessarily equate to these being stymied or repressed. Rather, these ideals may be fashioned in 
ways that allow students to act appropriately and ethically as apparently neutral tools in the administration of 
justice – a role required of them within democratic societies. Of course, this is not to suggest that it is possible 
for people to achieve such neutrality and act in such a way that they are not shaped by, or exercise, power, nor 
does it mean that the persona produced does not reflect particular gendered or cultural perspectives. Rather, the 
neutrality of this legal persona perhaps reflects a contemporary iteration of that which David Saunders (1997) 
has sketched historically – one who’s moral conscience remains a matter of private belief and does not influence 
their administrative public (professional) persona. 
In line with Foucault’s preference for asking ‘how’ questions over ‘why’ questions (Foucault 1978, p. 
224), this article does not seek to directly answer the ‘Holy Grail’ of legal education researchers mentioned 
above. Instead, it undertakes the more mundane task of highlighting the relationship that students are 
encouraged to establish with themselves. In doing so, this article offers a way of thinking about this loss of 
ideals that can add to previous analyses of legal education. Not only does it avoid repeating the (often critical) 
analyses that suggest social ideals are lost because students are repressed through law school to become 
facsimiles of a conservative legal profession, but it also adds to current legal education research inspired by 
Foucault, which focuses on the disciplinary and power-knowledge relations through which legal personae are 
formed, and which currently lacks a thorough understanding of the student’s relationship to their self in this 
process (Thornton 1996; James 2006, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d; Ball 2009). In addition, recognising that the 
construction of an apparently conservative legal persona may in fact be the result of a productive process of 
ethical self-government problematises political action in legal education based solely on the transformation of 
institutional power structures (the desire to institute a critical legal education or embed social justice 
perspectives and theory into the curriculum being two such pervasive examples). It therefore allows new forms 
of political engagement to develop in this context. In particular, analysing these prescriptive texts as resources 
used in the formation of legal personae, and drawing attention to the mundane ways that they seek to encourage 
students to work upon themselves, not only highlights the unacknowledged power effects of such advice, but 
also allows these texts to become a possible site of contestation. 
 
Australian Legal Education, Prescriptive Texts and the Formation of the Self 
The context of Australian legal education and the position of these prescriptive texts within it must be 
considered here. Much legal education in Australia occurs at the undergraduate level within the 32 universities 
that offer such degrees. Some universities allow students to study law as a stand-alone degree, while others do 
not give students the option – they must study law in conjunction with another degree. The undergraduate law 
degree most often satisfies the academic requirements for admission into the legal profession, though it is 
necessary to undertake a further period of practical legal training before one can practise (Lamb and Littrich 
2007). 
Concerned with the historically strong role that the profession played in academic legal education 
throughout Australia, the 1987 Pearce Report suggested that law schools ought to introduce a greater range of 
critical perspectives into the legal curriculum (Pearce, Campbell and Harding 1987), resulting in ongoing 
debates about the proper balance of legal knowledge, critical perspectives, and vocational training in law 
5 
 
degrees. While the curriculum does not entirely consist of vocational training, there are many aspects of the 
legal education environment that push students towards vocational orientations (often at the expense of critical 
content). There are a number of substantive areas of knowledge that must be studied if students wish to satisfy 
the academic requirements for admission. These eleven content areas – titled the ‘Priestly 11’ after Justice 
Priestly, the head of the committee that developed them – include criminal law and procedure, torts, contracts, 
property, equity, company law, administrative law, Federal and State constitutional law, civil procedure, 
evidence, and professional conduct (Lamb and Littrich 2007, p. 24; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 557). While 
each university covers these areas in different ways, and Australian legal education cannot be said to consist 
solely of vocational training, the curriculum is nevertheless largely developed in the shadow of these subject 
areas, pushing students towards practise in a narrow range of traditional, corporatist fields, at the expense of a 
wider variety of perspectives (note the absence of family law, or human rights law from these subjects, for 
example (Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 540 and 544; Simpson and Charlesworth 1995, p 106; Thornton 1996, 
p. 77)). This tendency has only been intensified in recent years since the Managing Justice report (ALRC 1999) 
recommended that law schools shift their focus away from ‘what lawyers need to know’ towards ‘what lawyers 
need to be able to do’. While this is concerned primarily with enhancing the generic skills and capabilities of 
students, it has intensified the vocational framework that is taken-for-granted as the point of reference for legal 
education by both staff and students. 
This legal education environment has developed against the backdrop of other changes in the higher 
education sector in Australian more generally. The rise of advanced liberal forms of government (often referred 
to as neo-liberalism) has altered the administration of social life more generally: the role of the state in directly 
regulating the lives of citizens has been reduced, and non-governmental organisations, communities, and 
individuals themselves have increasingly been responsibilised for regulating their own conduct in line with the 
broad aims of administrative bodies (Rose 1999; Dean 2010). Forms of prudential, risk-managing, and 
entrepreneurial subjectivity are encouraged, wherein individuals are tasked with shaping their lives so that they 
make an ‘investment’ in themselves. These changes have increasingly come to characterise the higher education 
context, where students are encouraged to be entrepreneurial in their selection of subjects and degrees, 
ultimately conceiving of their education as an investment in their future. They are positioned (by themselves and 
universities) as consumers of educational products, with curricula increasingly shaped to respond to the 
concomitant demand for skills training and vocationally relevant content that such entrepreneurs expect, and 
through which they will be able to gain an effective return on the educational ‘investment’ they have made 
(Olssen 2008, pp. 41-42). 
One product of these broader shifts towards inculcating entrepreneurialism in students within the legal 
education context is the greater provision of advice that will allow them to act most effectively in these ways. 
While texts offering students advice about how to study law effectively have existed for a long time (Learning 
the Law – one text considered here – has been in print since 1945), there has recently been a proliferation of 
these texts. They are increasingly being taken up as part of the legal curriculum – whether as recommended 
readings for students to complete prior to commencing their degree, as resources embedded more formally 
within the curriculum, or, increasingly, as essential aspects of the support initiatives offered to law students 
(such as within programs designed to prevent students developing mental illness) (see for example ALSA no 
date; LawCare Limited no date). Students are encouraged more and more to engage with these texts, which are 
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increasingly focusing on ever more specific skills or study areas to allow students to gain a greater competitive 
edge in their education (see, for example, Campbell and Fox 2003; Hyams, Campbell and Evans, 2004; Morley 
2009; Snape and Watt 2004). Thus, it can be suggested that the institutional power relations of legal education 
discussed above set the context for two important phenomena relevant here – a move away from social justice 
ideals in favour of vocational concerns that allow a better return on one’s educational ‘investment’, and the 
increased role of these texts in shaping the self in legal education. 
This article offers a detailed reading of a sample of key ‘prescriptive’ texts – those texts that suggest 
rules of conduct and guidance to people, enabling them ‘…to question their own conduct, to watch over and 
give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects’ (Foucault 1990, pp. 12-13) – drawn from the range 
of advice suggested to Australian students regarding how they might ‘survive’ law school. While historical and 
comparative analyses of these texts would undoubtedly provide insights into contemporary legal education in 
Australia, this article focuses specifically on the forms of self-fashioning that are suggested within these texts. 
The article also does not offer a complete picture of all such practices and texts informing the construction of 
legal personae, nor is it possible here to determine the uptake of this advice by students – this remains the task 
of further research. It is focused simply on analysing the modes of self-fashioning suggested to students within 
these texts, using Foucault’s work in this area, in order to address an imbalance within much of the critical legal 
analyses of legal education. Modes of self-fashioning are essential aspects of the way that legal personae are 
formed, especially in advanced liberal societies, and yet critical analyses of legal education focused on the 
power relations exercised by law schools or the profession do not generally analyse these relations. In addition, 
the specific focus of this analysis can provide insights into the shaping of social justice ideals among students in 
legal education. 
The self-fashioning mentioned above, Foucault suggests, works in conjunction with knowledge and 
power relations that cannot determine the self that is shaped (Foucault 1982, p. 225; Miller and Rose 2008). In 
The Use of Pleasure and his other discussions of ethics and the self, Foucault proposes four axes along which it 
is possible to analyse the relationship to the self: the ethical substance to be worked on (that is, the ‘parts’ that 
one takes to consist of one’s self and which act as the targets of self-fashioning); the mode of subjection 
underpinning this process (that is, the discourses positioned as truthful and in accordance with which the 
government of the self may be aligned); the ethical work involved (such as the array of physical and mental 
practices through which this fashioning is carried out); and the telos of these practices (the form of self 
positioned as desirable) (Foucault 1990, pp. 26-28). These axes will be used to examine five prescriptive texts 
advising how to ‘survive’ law school or study law at university: Surviving Law School (Brogan and Spencer 
2005), Studying Law @ Uni: Everything You Need To Know (Chesterman and Rhoden 2005), Starting Law 
(Corkery 2002), Mastering Law Studies and Law Exam Techniques (Krever 2006), and Learning the Law 
(Smith 2002). With the exception of Learning the Law, these are Australian texts and suggested to Australian 
law students,2 and have been chosen because of the breadth of information about legal study they provide to 
students – they are not focused simply on one particular element of the curriculum, or one specific legal or 
                                                 
2 While Learning the Law is a British text, it forms part of this analysis because it is available alongside the above texts, is referred to by 
them, and is considered a classic. First published in 1945, and now in its fourteenth edition, this article examines the twelfth edition, as it 
was this edition that was recommended and available to students at the time this analysis was undertaken. 
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academic skill as some other texts are (for example, Macken 2006; Hyams, Campbell and Evans 2004; 
Campbell and Fox 2003; Snape and Watt 2004; Morley 2009). 
 
The Desired Legal Persona 
While these texts suggest a range of different kinds of legal personae, the common thread between 
them, perhaps unsurprisingly, given the strength of vocational discourses in Australian legal education, is that 
the legal persona formed must be able to operate within the professional legal context. It is clear that 
professional discourses are privileged throughout legal education, and critical scholars have argued that this 
occurs at the expense of other discourses, such as those that consider the broader social context of the law (Hunt 
1986, pp. 11-13; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 540; Ward 2004, p. 147; James 2004b). While these discourses 
may appear to dominate within teaching practices and curricula, the focus on forming a professional legal 
persona within these texts cannot be said to be completely at the expense of broader concerns. Students are not 
simply encouraged to work on developing their legal skills, nor are they to be blind to broader social contexts. In 
fact, these texts encourage students to incorporate issues of social justice within their professional persona. 
This ideal legal persona is characterised by professional skills, a concern for ethical values, and a desire 
to achieve justice. Surviving Law School suggests that law schools actually seek to ‘produce “generalists” . . . 
who can critically think about the law as well as practise in a general practice . . . .  [and cater] for a wide variety 
of clients with differing legal problems’ (Brogan and Spencer 2005, p. 28). Certainly, this ‘critical thinking 
about the law’ refers more to analysing the internal consistency of a legal argument than a critique aimed at 
social change as such (that is, aligning with James’ formulation of doctrinal critique in contrast to radical 
critique (James 2004a)). Nevertheless, while the various modalities of this professional persona include a 
disparate group of professional roles (corporate lawyers, criminal lawyers, prosecutors, and those who work for 
community organisations) (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 7-8; Smith 2002, pp. 225-261; Corkery 2002, pp. 
105-110; Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, pp. 5-17), the fact that they are suggested as legal personae that 
students may become upon adopting the advice of these texts suggests there is some similarity between them. 
These include the ability to solve legal problems (no matter the context in which they occur), and the 
overarching concern for justice (which is the purpose of the law). Thus, the potential outcome of these practices 
is not a specific kind or type of lawyer, but rather a sort of core legal persona constituted by a range of different 
discourses (including doctrinal, vocational, and liberal discourses – see James 2004b, 2004c, 2004d) and that 
can be directed towards different ends. As such, it can be suggested that (at least within these texts) there does 
not necessarily appear to be a stark difference between the corporate lawyer and the lawyer who works in a 
community legal centre, apart from the modalities of their discursive practise, and the ends to which it is put. 
While the shape of the professional legal persona presented here is characterised primarily by the 
development of legal knowledge and skills (see further Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, p. 4), there is also a focus 
on developing ethical values. This is most apparent within Starting Law, which encourages students to strive for 
the most ethical standards of professional conduct, and not to simply win a case by any means possible. Though 
they must act for the client, their first duty is to the court, and they must therefore not act in a way that will 
pervert justice. This also requires being prepared to provide legal services to any client who seeks them, and 
advocating as far as ethically possible for that client (Corkery 2002, pp. 101-104). As Starting Law suggests, 
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‘the professional is characterised by the ideal of service to the public and the virtues of “emotional neutrality”’, 
which means that ‘[h]e [sic] must provide service to whoever requests it, irrespective of the requesting client’s 
age, income, kinship, politics, race, religion, sex, and social status’ (Greenwood cited in Corkery 2002, p. 101). 
These ethical discourses do not prevent students from following specific paths within the law (such as 
business, tax, constitutional, or family law), or from practising their legal persona according to their own 
personal interests. In some cases, they are even encouraged to be concerned with social justice if they so desire. 
However, where such a concern is apparent, it is to be governed in very specific ways. Students are discouraged 
from seeking to act in the service of only one particular cause. Specifically, they are not to overtly fight for 
causes about which they are personally motivated, as this may cause them to select who they offer legal services 
to on the basis of political association. Thus, fighting for causes they personally find politically appealing, and 
refusing to serve clients representing causes they find repulsive, are positioned as two sides of the one unethical 
coin. While these texts imply that zealous advocacy is a desirable disposition for professional lawyers, this 
becomes unethical once the lawyer lies to the court, adopts the mantle of a political activist, or allows their 
moral conscience to guide the provision of legal services. 
In order to act on one’s concerns for social justice, these texts encourage students to channel such 
ideals into legal aid or pro bono work, and not radical social change (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 11-13; 
Corkery 2002, pp. 20 and 105). According to these texts, it is through legal aid and community legal centres that 
students can help those who ‘fall through the cracks’. Starting Law, for example, recommends students 
participate in providing legal aid, which it argues is ‘the most significant form of financial assistance to the 
needy litigant’ (Corkery 2002, p. 20). Similarly, Surviving Law School suggests that students can also 
participate in community organisations that serve disadvantaged areas, or volunteer at community legal centres 
(Brogan and Spencer 2005, p. 12). Again, it is certainly the case that these discourses present particular 
understandings of the needs of disadvantaged groups and thus govern the forms of assistance that students 
understand as appropriate and necessary. However, critiques about whether this advice goes far enough to 
address significant forms of disadvantage aside, these texts clearly provide students with viable models for 
productively acting as a legal professional while also giving expression to social justice ideals, identifying 
inequalities in laws, attempting social and legal reform, and improving access to justice (Brogan and Spencer 
2005, pp. 12-13). 
 
Becoming a ‘Bastion Against Tyranny’ 
Liberal democratic ideals and discourses are used within these texts to both justify the advice they 
present and convince students to adopt their suggestions. The legal persona that students are to construct is one 
that functions within a liberal democracy, protecting basic freedoms and civil rights, and upholding the rule of 
law. Starting Law states that ‘[the l]aw and justice are the custodians of liberty’, and that ‘[l]awyers. . . spend 
much time protecting the liberty of the individual and guarding civil rights’ (Corkery 2002, p. 17). According to 
these texts, legal personae achieve these values simply by becoming good advocates who can represent either 
side of a legal dispute (Krever 2006, p. 9) and act for their clients, ‘however evil, eccentric or unpopular’ 
(Robertson in Corkery 2002, p. 102). While this focus on acting within legal institutions has been criticised for 
providing a narrow view of social and legal change, and for relying on an assumption that there is equality in 
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access to the law (Hunt 1986, pp. 11-13; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 540; Ward 2004, p. 147; James 2004b; 
Booth 2004, p. 281), one must consider how such an approach forms part of a coherent and ethical legal persona 
and thus why this narrow focus is positioned as favourable in these texts. Students are encouraged to develop a 
legal persona that is able to simply administer the law, without regard for the particular cause that their client 
might represent. This technical role in the administration of justice is clearly expressed by Boswell, who states 
that ‘[a] lawyer has no business with the justice or injustice of the cause which he [sic] undertakes. . . The 
justice or injustice of the cause is to be decided by the judge’ (cited in Corkery 2002, p. 102). Thus, a functional 
legal persona, according to these texts, simply facilitates the administration of the machinery of legal justice. 
Despite these assertions, it is clear from these texts that the effective administration of justice does not 
restrict the legal persona to acting solely as an advocate. This does not mean that students are encouraged to 
actively pursue social and political change as part of their legal persona – doing so would overstep the role of 
the legal persona as a tool in the administration of justice. The active pursuit of social and legal change must 
remain the responsibility of the citizens of a democratic society. However, there is space within this discourse 
for legal personae to pursue what might be considered socially-just ends as part of this administrative role. For 
example, Starting Law suggests that, ‘[t]he study of law makes [students] sensitive to “the approach of 
tyranny”’ (Corkery 2002, p. 8). By being so aware, students are then encouraged to act as a ‘bastion against 
tyranny’, maintaining a constant vigil over the protection of civil rights and freedoms in the society of which 
they are a part. As this text continues: 
[a] guard may march around endlessly, but there will be a time when he [sic] has to act to 
protect his [sic] charge. So, too, with a lawyer in a democratic society . . . In a time of strife 
or chaos, an unworthy or unscrupulous leader may rise to power, or a government will 
abuse its power for its own ends. This is when lawyers can stand up and play a crucial role 
in our society (Corkery 2002, p. 8). 
The metaphor of a guard against injustice is to be adopted by students as somewhat of a creed that 
clearly expresses this mode of subjection. If they observe erosions in such rights, they are to stand against them, 
but to do so by reaffirming the institutions of the law and the values upon which they are based. 
Additionally, these texts suggest that a necessary part of the effective administration of justice is 
ensuring equal access to justice. According to these texts, improving access to justice and ensuring formal 
equality before the law is therefore a natural extension of an interest in ensuring justice is achieved. It is 
therefore suggested that an appropriate way of channelling the student’s socially idealistic concerns and 
addressing the disadvantage that the law can and has produced (towards Indigenous Australians, women, and 
non-English-speaking people, for example) (Corkery 2002, p. 18; Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 11-13), is by 
improving access to the law. Again, while this can be criticised as a narrow approach to addressing 
disadvantage, it clearly accords with the mode of subjection underpinning these texts. 
Within this mode of subjection, it is obvious that methods for achieving justice focus on acting within, 
or improving, the operation of the systems of law that already exist in a society – they generally do not involve 
appeals to social justice, one’s moral conscience, or other extrinsic values. These discourses posit that legal 
personae are to be concerned simply with the administration of these systems, and not with their radical 
subversion – to subvert them would be understood as undemocratic and an abuse of power. As a result, it is 
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possible to suggest that the idealism of students entering law schools is not necessarily always lost, but upon 
engaging with these discourses (both through these texts and also through other relations of power within law 
school), may be channelled in certain productive ways, such as towards maintaining vigilance regarding 
liberties, addressing problems with access to justice, and protecting society from the approach of tyranny. The 
advice provided by these texts directs students away from seeking to radically subvert or fundamentally alter the 
social and legal systems of the society – not because preventing such radical change is in the vested interests of 
institutionalised power, but because, according to this mode of subjection, to do so would not be a productive or 
ethical iteration of the legal persona. While, along the lines of much critical scholarship, this may appear to 
result in conservative legal personae lacking any social justice orientation and may render further invisible the 
role of lawyers in perpetuating systems of social and legal disadvantage, when considered according to the mode 
of subjection outlined above, this can be understood as simply one way of ethically performing the legal persona 
in a democratic society (where such change is to originate in the people and not the administrative personae 
responsible for the application of that public will) (Saunders 1997). Thus, attempts to have legal personae adopt 
active and highly politicised commitments to social and legal change in line with social justice ideals (such as 
through curriculum reforms) are unlikely to fully succeed as long as this particular mode of subjection remains. 
 
Fashioning a Legal Persona 
An essential part of the advice that these texts present to students consists of an array of practices that 
they may use in order to give shape to the legal personae suggested. In the process, these practices act on a 
number of ethical substances, including the student’s skills, knowledge, ethical and moral values frameworks, 
and mode of comportment, through forms of reflection, the adoption of conceptual frameworks, reading and 
recall practices, and regimes of bodily discipline.3 
 
Governing Morals and Ethical Values 
Through a number of practices suggested in these texts, students are to govern their moral and ethical 
values frameworks. One example is the technique of self-reflection. Many texts encourage students, early in 
their degree, to reflect on why they have chosen to study law, such as by asking themselves ‘What would I like 
to do with my life?’, ‘What are my interests?’, and ‘Why am I studying law?’ (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 
14; Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, p. 3). In the process, students are to construct themselves as objects of 
knowledge, extract a truth about themselves (i.e. their intentions), and use this truth to govern their future 
actions within the law degree. 
For example, Starting Law suggests that, prior to beginning their legal studies, students write their own 
obituary. It asks them to ‘[i]magine that [they] have (sadly) died at [their] average life expectancy age [. . . and 
then] write [their] own 200 word obituary, as [they] would wish it do be, after a lifetime in the law’ (Corkery 
2002, p. 17). This future representation of themselves is to have an effect in the present by guiding how they 
engage with legal education – their own death is brought into play in governing their life. While perhaps an 
                                                 
3 Only a selection of pertinent practices will be examined here. 
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effective tool for ensuring students maintain a direction in their legal studies, this technique of self-formation 
can also act as a moral guide, governing the appropriate career goals students may adopt. The implicit intent of 
this practice is for students to aim to do something admirable in their future professional lives, whether that is to 
have a successful career, play a role in the forces that shape society, or to help others by achieving justice 
through the law (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 2 and 9-11; Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, p. 3; Corkery 2002, 
pp. 1-2). At the very least, they are to ensure that they will be comfortable with the path that they take, which, to 
some degree, may give those students with strong professional motivations some pause before embarking on 
such a career path. 
Students are also to govern their ethics and moral values by following the examples of idealistic and 
eminent members of the profession and judiciary. Both Starting Law and Learning the Law are replete with such 
suggestions. Starting Law, for example, encourages students to model themselves on the actions of other legal 
personalities because, ‘the story of [the legal system’s] greatest judges is the history of the system’, and it is 
through these personalities that ‘the law gains richness, meaning and some of its authority’ (Corkery 2002, p. 
xi). Additionally, students are encouraged to engage with these stories as an effective way of governing their 
ethical perspectives: 
[e]thics and competent practice are more easily gleaned through the study of the successful 
professional lives of leading lawyers than through dry lectures on these subjects . . . 
[because h]eroic and inspirational lives invite imitation (Corkery 2002, p. 111). 
To shape their lives according to these models, students are to read the biographies or autobiographies 
of, and other texts by, these personalities. Lord Denning, Justice Lionel Murphy, and Justice Michael Kirby are 
each held up as models to demonstrate to law students that those at the pinnacle of the legal profession maintain 
(and are even centrally motivated by) idealism, thus implying that such values are viable components of the 
legal persona (Corkery 2002, pp. 4, 5 and 17). 
 
‘Thinking Like a Lawyer’: Shaping Skills and Knowledge 
The legally specific and generic skills of students, as well as their legal knowledge, can also be worked 
upon through some of the practices suggested in these texts. One such practice is the adoption of specific 
conceptual frameworks that determine the student’s relation to legal knowledge, and suggest procedures they 
can employ to engage with and use that knowledge. 
Three conceptual frameworks are presented in these texts to allow students to ‘think like a lawyer’. 
One focuses on understanding the ‘dialectical’ nature of the law, another on solving legal problems, and the 
third on how to use legal theory. The primary framework is referred to in Mastering Law Studies and Law Exam 
Techniques as requiring a legal ‘dialectic’ approach (Krever 2006, pp. 5-6), providing students with a way of 
understanding how the law changes and develops. It suggests that legal change occurs when two disputing 
parties offer different interpretations of current laws and precedents. By applying the law to the facts of a case in 
a dispute, this ‘grey area’ of the law is addressed and a legal outcome reached (also see Brogan and Spencer 
2005, p. 80). In conjunction with this framework is the ‘legal problem-solving method’, which Surviving Law 
School suggests must become ‘the first thing a lawyer addresses his or her mind to when a client comes to seek 
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advice’ (Brogan and Spencer 2005, p. 80). This generally involves: recognising relevant legal issues; identifying 
applicable laws; constructing an argument by allying the law to the facts; and developing a conclusion in the 
form of advice to a client (Brogan and Spencer 2005, p. 85; Corkery 2002, pp. 228-229; Krever 2006, p. 64). It 
also entails asking only legally relevant questions; consulting the primary documents of the law (judge’s 
decisions and legislation); and identifying elements that will strengthen their argument (such as the authority of 
previous decisions) (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 86-95; Smith 2002, pp. 101-105).  
The third conceptual framework is not elaborated to the same extent as the previous frameworks, and 
relates to the student’s understanding of legal theory. Studying Law @ Uni suggests that a grasp of legal theory 
is useful because it can ‘help lawyers and jurists to organise ideas’ and gain ‘a broader understanding of the 
forces that determine [legal] rules and shape their application to particular circumstances’ (Chesterman and 
Rhoden 2005, pp. 52 and 78). Similarly, Surviving Law School states that ‘[s]tudying law requires an 
understanding about how the law fits into societies; how it is, or is not, equivalent to notions of justice; and 
importantly what the law should be’ (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 151-153; Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, pp. 
79-86). 
Both the dialectical approach and the legal problem-solving method work together in the formation of 
the professional legal persona by ensuring students can ‘think like a lawyer’. As the role of the lawyer according 
to the mode of subjection outlined above involves constructing the best case for their client, legal personae must 
appreciate the dialectical nature of the law, consider other possible interpretations of the law, translate problems 
into legally relevant questions, gather information from specific sources (the primary sources of the law, which 
are prioritised because they contain the law, and solving legal problems does not require engaging with 
commentary outside of the law (Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 183-197; Corkery 2002, pp. 32 and 34-35; Smith 
2002, p. 79; Krever 2006, p. 22)), read these texts in particular ways and ask only relevant questions of that 
information (such as what are the pertinent facts that led to the creation of a precedent that will allow me to 
distinguish this case from others and exploit the ‘grey area’ of the law, or what is the ratio decidendi of this 
case? (Chesterman and Rhoden 2005, pp. 43-46, 69-74 and 76; Smith 2002, p. 77-79; Corkery 2002, pp. 34-55; 
Kobetsky in Krever 2006, p. 296; Krever 2006, p. 21)), and draw conclusions that solve the issue as a ‘legal 
problem’ (Brogan and Spencer 2005, p. 3; Krever 2006, p. 11). In the process, as other scholars point out, 
certain questions (especially those relating to broader social injustices) do not get asked (Hunt 1986, pp. 11-13; 
Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 540; Ward 2004, p. 147; James 2004b; Booth 2004, p. 281). Additionally, this 
approach to solving legal problems means that, while useful, legal theories that critique and challenge the law or 
recognise the social impact of the law are pushed to the side when dealing specifically with legal issues (Hunt 
1986, p. 10; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, pp. 540 and 557; Simpson and Charlesworth 1995, p. 106; Thornton 
2004, p. 495; Thornton 1996, p. 77). According to this mode of subjection, these questions and concerns have 
no place in solving legal problems. However, this is not to say that they are irrelevant to the formation of a legal 
persona. Though this mode of subjection presents them as irrelevant when acting as an advocate, they are 
clearly important when legal personae undertake the task of reforming the law through existing legal 
institutions, and in the interests of justice – that is, when acting as a ‘bastion against tyranny’. 
It must also be noted that through these techniques, a very specific picture of legal knowledge is 
produced – one that is directly linked to solving legal problems and advocating for clients, as opposed to one 
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focused on fundamental social and political change, and critique of the law. Clearly, the practices that are to be 
used to give shape to the legal knowledge that students engage with are also to have an effect on the formation 
of the self, and the way they understand and undertake legal and social change. 
 
Governing the Mode of Comportment: ‘Being’ a Legal Persona 
An important aspect of fashioning the self in line with this mode of subjection is the physical 
performance of the legal persona – specifically its bodily comportment, style of dress, and speech. These texts 
speak about this embodiment primarily in the context of mooting activities, and it is to serve as a way of clearly 
and effectively presenting a client’s case in court and performing the neutrality required of legal personae in the 
administration of justice. 
The student’s speech is one target of these practices. Phrases such as ‘it is submitted’ or my ‘learned 
friend’ are suggested as techniques for ensuring civility in the court proceedings, and so students remember that, 
in court, ‘it is the parties to the dispute, not counsel, who are in disagreement’ (Cassidy in Krever 2006, p. 93; 
see also Smith 2002, pp. 196-197). This is to prevent counsel expressing their own opinions and concerns about 
the justice or injustice of the issue. Additionally, governing speech is to feature as an element of presenting a 
case most effectively as an advocate. They must speak with ‘great deliberation and force’ (Smith 2002, p. 202), 
plan what they will say, express their main points persuasively, and pause after doing so to let these points sink 
in (Smith 2002, p. 197; Cassidy in Krever 2006, p. 94), undertaking speech training and identifying defects in 
the attractiveness of their speech by listening to recordings of their voice or comparing their speech to other 
speakers on the radio to assist them here (Smith 2002, pp. 200-201). 
Students are also encouraged to recognise that their bodily stance and actions are also invested in the 
performance of the legal persona and must be governed accordingly. They are encouraged to stand when 
presenting an argument or being addressed by the court, and to sit when their opponent is speaking, so that 
communication between the advocates and the bench remains clear (Cassidy in Krever 2006, pp. 92-93; Smith 
2002, p. 196). As Learning the Law suggests, students should: ‘[l]ook at the audience as [they] speak, and turn 
to different sections of them’, while also ‘[using their] hands to emphasise points – not in too exaggerated a 
way, but sufficiently to show that [they] are putting [their] whole being into it’ (Smith 2002, p. 202). They ought 
to also become familiar with body language so that they can use this to greatest effect (Corkery 2002, p. 248), 
avoid fidgeting or rocking on their feet as these will distract the judge, and ‘[t]ry to restrict arm movement by 
lightly resting [their] hands on the lectern or lightly clasp[ing them] behind [their] back’ (Cassidy in Krever 
2006, pp. 94-95). In adopting such practices, the student is to recognise their body as a tool for communication, 
to be used to ‘help persuade the judges towards a particular viewpoint’ (Cassidy in Krever 2006, p. 93). 
Finally, according to these texts, the student’s dress is also to become a target of government. Starting 
Law in particular states that a ‘[m]essy or unkempt or informal appearance risks the displeasure of the court. 
This must be taken into account, for [the] client’s sake’ (Corkery 2002, p. 248). Additionally, students are 
encouraged to recognise that wearing wigs and gowns are essential garb for successfully performing the legal 
persona: ‘[r]obing promotes the notion that the system is trying the issues objectively’ (Corkery 2002, p. 248). 
Here, through robing (or at the very least dressing neatly and formally), the legal persona is materially 
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demonstrating that it is encased in a layer of objectivity – again, presented as an essential element of performing 
this administrative role effectively (see also ABC 2008). 
These practices of self-government directed at the law student’s comportment clearly link to the mode 
of subjection discussed above. Students are to govern their bodies so that they become clear and effective 
communicators, able to advocate for clients in court in the most effective manner possible (utilising their speech, 
body, and dress), while at the same time remaining a neutral tool in the administration of justice. While this form 
of comportment may appear conservative, archaic, or of no contemporary relevance to some (ABC 2008), 
thought about using Foucault’s tools discussed above, it can be understood as part of the successful performance 
of legal personae in a democratic society, and an embodiment of the ideal image of legal personae as neutral 
tools in the administration of justice. Mastering Law Studies and Law Exam Techniques hints at this productive 
role: 
legal disputes, and thus the courtroom, can become heated. These courtesies and 
conventions can help maintain order in the courtroom . . . [and] they also serve as a means 
of displaying the advocate’s respect for both the court and the law administered therein 
(Cassidy in Krever 2006, p. 91). 
The techniques considered here – self-reflection, the adoption of frameworks to shape one’s relation to 
legal knowledge, and the disciplining of the body – all align with the mode of subjection discussed above. They 
allow students to act in a way that they understand as politically neutral, and useful for effectively solving legal 
problems to achieve justice. While this leads to specific conceptual frameworks (which privilege certain forms 
and sources of legal knowledge, and direct students to solve legal problems in particular ways) being suggested, 
and inevitably means that in the process, some topics (such as social justice issues) are not considered, and some 
questions (such as whether the law should operate in a particular manner) are not asked, this is not necessarily 
part of a conspiratorial project to ensure that the ideals of law students are repressed and legal personae privilege 
only the interests of the few. Rather, it is part of an ethical work on the self directed towards ensuring that justice 
is achieved in a democratic society. Clearly, the practices through which students are encouraged to fashion their 
legal personae can only draw from the discourses about that persona that circulate within such societies. 
 
Criticising this Advice 
While this article has sought to highlight how this advice, and the models of legal personae presented 
throughout these texts, can be understood as productive and need not signify the repression of a student’s ideals 
or a lack of social justice, one may still criticise the shape of this persona. It is one encouraged to undertake only 
specific forms of social and legal change (those that largely maintain the status quo), and is one that remains 
‘gendered’ and ‘raced’ in particular ways. 
Becoming a legal persona according to the advice presented in these texts requires taking for granted 
the established institutions of legal justice as the privileged site in which and through which justice is achieved. 
The only (very slight) diversion from this is the role accorded to community legal centres, or pro bono activities, 
as an outlet for the expression of social justice ideals – and even these sites seek only to improve one’s access to 
or representation within these established legal institutions. Other ways of ‘doing’ justice are not considered 
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unless they are authorised by, able to be inscribed within, or work to buttress, these traditional institutions. In 
these texts, alternative approaches to social and political change, including the fundamental subversion of legal 
structures, are not positioned as appropriate (Hunt 1986, pp. 11-13; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, p. 540; Ward 
2004, p. 147; James 2004b; Booth 2004, p. 281). 
It is also clear that the legal persona that is to be produced is thoroughly masculine. The appearance of 
masculine pronouns throughout this advice is a simple testament to this (see Corkery 2002, pp. 8 and 101, quoted 
above, for examples). The models that students are to engage with are also primarily male figures. For example, 
the biographies that students are encouraged to read within Starting Law are exclusively male biographies 
(Corkery 2002, pp. 111-113), while only two biographies written about women are suggested to students within 
Learning the Law (Smith 2002, pp. 268-271), both of which tell the story of women that have been successful 
within the traditional male-dominated institutions of the law – they are not biographies of radical feminist 
activists. While this reflects the traditional exclusion of women from the judiciary – particularly from the more 
powerful positions that are held up as models for others to emulate – it clearly reinforces the particular 
experience of the law that is to form part of the legal persona. 
The advice provided in these texts is also ‘raced’ in particular ways. While the perspectives taken are 
assumed to be neutral, the invisibility of race is quite stark. Beyond a few brief mentions recognising the 
disadvantage experienced by Indigenous Australians (see Brogan and Spencer 2005, pp. 11-13; Corkery 2002, p. 
18, quoted above, for examples), these texts do not encourage students to think about other ways of achieving 
justice, or other ways of ‘knowing’. The relation to knowledge that students are to develop, and the way they are 
to solve legal problems, requires a translation of a particular problem, which may have many extra-legal 
dimensions, into a legal issue, to then be solved only as a legal issue. What might appear as an arbitrary 
separation of legally relevant issues from other issues that may be just as relevant to achieving an adequate 
solution to the problem is an approach that excludes alternative ways of knowing and achieving justice (Hunt 
1986, p. 10; Keyes and Johnstone 2004, pp. 540 and 557; Simpson and Charlesworth 1995, p. 106; Thornton 
2004, p. 495; Thornton 1996, p. 77). Thus, as the legal persona to be produced is to be one that is thoroughly 
invested in existing legal institutions, it will clearly reflect the specific perspectives embedded historically within 
the development of the law. 
Critical legal scholars have drawn attention to these issues numerous times before, but this article parts 
company with this scholarship, as it does not assume that these relations are the result of clearly vested interests, 
nor does it believe that this signifies repression and indoctrination. While the advice of these texts certainly does 
reflect clear viewpoints which perpetuate a large amount of disadvantage, this discussion also shows that this 
advice is productive in particular ways. Given that, as Saunders (1997) suggests, neutral legal personae of this 
shape are historical remnants of attempts to quell confessional conflict in the early Modern period, and that 
attempts to produce lawyers that are overtly politically active on the basis of their own moral viewpoints have 
the potential to reintroduce confessional conflicts of a different kind into legal education, is it desirable to have 
legal personae subverting these legal institutions? With this in mind, should the radical subversion of legal power 
relations really be preferred over specific and gradual reforms to existing relations (such as achieving greater 
access to justice or requiring students to question the often privileged positions from which they speak)? (Ward 
2004, pp. 149-153). 
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Conclusion 
This article has examined the ways that a range of prescriptive texts suggest students ought to govern 
themselves in the formation of their legal personae. While it has not looked at how this advice is taken up by 
students, it has sketched the relation to the self that students are encouraged to establish. These texts suggest that 
students ought to work on a range of ethical substances – their skills, knowledge, values, and bodily 
comportment – through a variety of practices – including self-reflection, adopting conceptual frameworks and 
practices to produce legal knowledge in specific ways, and disciplining their body and speech – to become a 
legal persona in a democratic society who, while remaining politically neutral, must guard civil liberties and 
work to achieve justice through advocating for clients and ensuring access to justice. 
Acknowledging and exploring the role that relations of self-government play in the formation of legal 
personae allows legal education scholars to understand the loss of student ideals throughout legal education, 
mentioned at the beginning of this article, in a different way. It cannot be simply argued that the apparent lack of 
social ideals held by students necessarily occurs against the student’s own better judgment, or because they have 
acquiesced in the face of professional ideologies or the pressures of the market. Moreover, legal personae are not 
simply formed through disciplinary power relations and the interactions of power and knowledge, as suggested 
by some of the otherwise useful Foucauldian-inspired legal education scholarship (Thornton 1996; James 2006, 
2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d). Practices that appear as hallmarks of conservatism and which discourage critical 
questioning (such as the legal problem-solving method or the rituals associated with courtroom advocacy), or 
that may be decried for not going far enough to challenge the legal status quo (such as encouraging students to 
engage in nothing more institutionally upsetting as pro-bono or community legal work) (Keyes and Johnstone 
2004, pp. 543-544 and 557; Thornton 1996, pp. 77 and 80; Thornton 2004, p. 495; Simpson and Charlesworth 
1995, p. 106; Booth 2004, p. 281) can instead be understood as part of the way students can ensure that, as legal 
personae, they most effectively uphold the right of all clients to have their day in court and gain access to justice, 
while also allowing the lawyer to remain an apparently neutral tool in the administration of justice. Thus, while 
the persona suggested to students is still gendered and raced in specific ways, this analysis makes it possible to 
understand the apparent loss of ideals as an ethical relation to the self, and to understand what this form of power 
produces. 
As such, the presence of such conservatism does not necessarily signify a professional persona defined 
by and enacted in the interests of the legal profession, but could just as easily signify a legal persona that has 
been actively fashioned and represents an ethical form of legal persona in a democratic society, where social and 
legal change must be instigated and carried out by ‘the people’. This is not to deny the ability of the legal 
profession to govern the production of legal personae directly (through imposing standards, disciplinary 
practices and the like) or even ‘at a distance’ – after all, professional discourses are ever-present within these 
texts, and many of the power relations exercised directly by law schools engage these professional discourses as 
well. However, it must be recognised that throughout the construction of their legal persona, these texts still 
encourage students to maintain particular ideals concerning social justice and social change, and adopt specific 
methods for doing so. Specifically, they are to govern these in productive ways – such as through pro bono and 
community legal work – that do not seek to radically subvert the social and legal status quo. In this way, 
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graduates can remain within the ethical boundaries of legal personae operating as neutral tools in the 
administration of justice while still pursuing what they see as socially-just ends. 
While this article has only explored the messages offered to students within a handful of texts, and has 
not examined how these messages may be adopted,4 it nevertheless extends analyses of the production of 
modalities of self within legal education, and provides a new basis for forms of political intervention in legal 
education. It uncouples analyses of the formation of the self from assumptions that the persona produced is 
simply the result of disciplinary power, power-knowledge relations, or other forms of power ‘imposed’ upon 
students by the legal profession. In the process, it suggests that political interventions seeking to produce 
socially-just legal personae must not solely be directed towards the institutional structures of the law school. 
Instead, they must also account for, and possibly work with, this ethical relation to the self. Certainly, such 
interventions must recognise that this ethical relation to the self serves productive purposes and allows students 
to act effectively as legal personae while also pursuing socially-just ends. An understanding of self-fashioning in 
this context is central to more fully appreciating the operation of power through law schools, and offers an 
additional perspective on the loss of social ideals among law students. 
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